Introduction
In repeated games with private monitoring, the players' beliefs about past play will gradually drift apart as the game goes on, which makes it difficult to sustain an equilibrium that is based on common beliefs. One way to restore common belief about the aspects of past play that matter for forecasts of future play is for players to send "cheap-talk" messages to one another; if these messages are truthful, they will form a public state that can be used to govern the players' strategies. However, one of the first results on using communication in this way is negative: Matsushima [1991] proved that payoffs of equilibria with truthful, incentive compatible revelation of the signals every period are bounded away from efficiency in two-player games with independent signals. Subsequently, Compte [1998] and Kandori and Matsushima [1998] proved a folk theorem for two-player games with independent signals, by considering strategies that only report truthfully every T periods, where T goes to infinity as the discount factor goes to 1. 3 This paper shows how communication can yield a Nash-threats folk theorem in two-player games with "almost public" information but without independent signals. 4 Our proof is a combination of the idea that communication provides a public signal and an idea from Mailath and Morris [2002] . They provided a sufficient condition for a perfect public equilibrium of a game with public information to remain equilibrium when the information structure is perturbed to be almost public. We build on these ideas by introducing the possibility that the messages sent are coarser than the underlying private signals, which extends the class of games where our information conditions are satisfied.
A key hypothesis of the Mailath and Morris folk theorem is that the equilibrium strategies for the public information game depend only on a finite history of play. This 3 In addition, these papers, and also Ben-Porath and Kahneman [1996] , proved folk theorems for games with at least three players. With three or more players the report of a third player can be used to tell who is misreporting. We should also note that there are a number of folk theorem and related results in the twoplayer case without communication: Sekiguchi [1997] , Ely and Valimaki [2002] , Piccione [2002] and Bhaskar and Obara [2002] have all studied the prisoner's dilemma game without communication. 4 By "communication" we mean communication between the players, without the benefit of an intermediary. Aoyagi [2002] proves a folk theorem for games with a third-party mediator who receives private reports from the players and sends them non-binding instructions, as in the communication games of Forges [1986] and Myerson [1986] . See Kandori [2002] for a survey of studies of repeated games with private monitoring, both with and without communication.
implies that the strategies have a finite-automaton description. Consequently, when the information structure is close enough to public information, the current states of the automata are almost common knowledge. Since repeated games with perfect information have efficient equilibria with finite memory, the Mailath-Morris result yields a folk theorem for games of almost-perfect, almost-public information, but the hypothesis of this theorem need not be satisfied for general games of almost-public information.
Our starting point is a game of publicly observed signals, and the Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [1994] (FLM) result that a folk theorem holds if there is "sufficient" public information. When players observe private signals but make public announcements, there is the possibility of constructing "FLM-like" equilibria in which the players' actions depend only on the announcements. However, the FLM techniques cannot be immediately applied, because it is necessary for the equilibrium to provide incentives for the players to "report truthfully."
The basic contribution of this paper is to show how this can be done when players receive signals that are highly but not perfectly correlated. Although the results generalize from the two-person case, in many respects it is an advantage to have more than two players, because it is possible to build equilibria by comparing the reports of different players, and using "third parties" to effectively enforce contracts. For this reason we focus here on the two-player case, and show that even without third parties, we have a folk theorem when the players' signals are highly correlated. 
The Model
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, where 9 is a finite set that is the same for each player. 5 A Given a message profile M , the information structure Q induces a distribution over the diagonal of announcement profiles. We denote by 
Note that for this to be well defined there must be positive probability of I receiving the signal I Z when the players play A . 
When this condition is satisfied for some positive ν and "small" F we say that the game has "almost public messaging." This condition says that most of the time, each player is fairly confident of the other player's message; in the limit case of (0,ν )-public information, the two players' messages are perfectly correlated, so that they are public information. This condition is closely related to the Mailath and Morris definition of " F -close to public monitoring," but it is weaker in two ways. First of all, Mailath and Morris suppose that each player i's private signal I Z lies in the same set as do the signals in the limiting pubic-information game; in our setting this corresponds to
Second, they suppose that in the public information limit, every signal has strictly positive probability under every action profile, and that the distribution of each player's private signals is close to this limit. These conditions imply condition (1) above, and a stronger version of condition (2), namely that
. Given the assumption that
, their conditions are equivalent to ours, but when there are many private signals corresponding to a given public message, our condition (2) is significantly weaker, as it allows the private signals to differ in how informative they are about the message the opposing player will send.
Note that our condition is easier to satisfy with coarse message maps m, and indeed it is vacuously satisfied if
M are equal to the same constant; the condition will have force when combined with the assumption that the messages "reveal enough" about the action profile that generated the underlying signals.
Notice that, except in the trivial case of perfect information, condition (2) 
This condition is never satisfied in games such as Green and Porter [1984] , where the two players have the same sets of feasible actions, and the distribution of signals satisfies the
Q Q , but it is satisfied for a set of probability measures A Q of full Lebesgue measure.
The Nash Threats Folk Theorem
Let V be a static Nash payoff vector. We may conveniently normalize V .
Fix a sequence of games with common ! : 9 G , and with signal probabilities N Q . e) whenever the current profile is other than a static Nash equilibrium, any deviation from the current period equilibrium action costs at least E I in current period average present value.
For any E and an equilibrium satisfying the conditions above; we refer to the strategies in this equilibrium as the base strategy. Our method of proof will be to use base strategies to construct equilibrium strategies in the game of interest.
Fix a E . Recall from the definition of public information that O is the minimum probability (for any N ) of disagreement given that one player lies. Define e
which is a probability for E sufficiently large, and recalling that
Q is the probability of agreement. We now define
which is also a probability if Q E is.
We now consider the public information game with discount factor
We construct a map D from public histories N H T in the game of interest to the set of histories of the same length in the public-information game ( and the symbol 0 (for punishment). This map induces strategies in the original game by assigning the profile from the base game strategy when the history is mapped to a history in ( , and by assigning the static Nash equilibrium when the history is mapped to P. We will show that these strategies form an equilibrium in the original game.
Formally, we define the strategies in the game N by the action taken by the base strategy, or the static Nash strategies respectively. The map D is defined as follows. We map the initial null history to the null history. Given that all histories of length T have been mapped, we define the map for length T histories
When the history is understood, we will abuse notation and write T A to be the action taken in the base strategy given the history
. It is convenient also to define
Notice that we have chosen
, we also have
Case 0: If the current base strategy profile is a static Nash equilibrium use the public 
and with the remaining probability
The remainder of the proof, which is in the appendix, verifies that these strategies form an equilibrium in game n with average payoffs n v , and that there is a sequence
Remark: The proof can easily be adjusted so that the equilibrium, except when the static Nash equilibrium is played, is strict of order G E , where
Moreover if we perturb the game so that G G F b and Q Q F b , then for any fixed δ the average discounted value of particular strategies changes by at most
, and the perturbed game still has a static equilibrium with payoffs 0 the theorem continues to hold for the perturbed game and discount factor E . Tracing out the equilibrium payoffs corresponding to the various histories, it follows that the convex hull of this set is self-generating for E , and hence by the results of Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin [1994] 
In particular, this covers the case in which the payoffs have the form 
Discussion
A crucial element of these results is the fact that the announcements are public information. Since there is already a folk theorem for games of public information, the question arises as to whether or not it can be applied directly to the game with messages, or whether in fact a separate proof is needed. Here we briefly indicate why the Fudenberg, Levine and Maskin (FLM) result does not apply to the announcement game.
The FLM folk theorem is limited to the convex hull of the set of profiles that satisfy enforceability plus pairwise identifiability. Fix a profile, including a strategy for sending messages. This determines for each player a probability distribution over messages sent. We refer to this as the marginal. One thing a player could do is to randomize his announcements independent of his private information, in such a way that the marginal distribution of messages is preserved; call this "faking the marginal."
Unless the given profile called for players to ignore their private signals, pairwise identifiability fails, because player one faking his marginal and player two faking hers are observationally equivalent, so the FLM result does not apply, and if we restrict attention to strategies where players make meaningless reports, the only public equilibria will have a static equilibrium outcome in every period.
Turning to applications of the main theorem, one feature is that it allows the possibility that players aggregate information by making the same announcement for several different private signals. Aggregating signals has two effects: First, it increases the degree to which each player can forecast the other player's message, which reduces the role of private information. Second, it reduces the informativeness of the messages, making it less likely that the assumption of pairwise full-rank is satisfied. However, when each player's signal space I : is at least as large as ! ! (the minimum size consistent with pairwise full rank) it is possible to aggregate the signals while still allowing the messages to carry a substantial amount of information on the actions that were played. This observation has some importance when we notice that the proof of the Theorem remains valid even if we allow the space of private signals : to vary, provided that the set 9 remains fixed. The working paper version of this paper gives an illustrative example.
Appendix: Completion of the proof of the Theorem
We must verify that the strategies constructed in the text form an equilibrium in game n with average payoffs when the discount factor is
It is convenient to do calculation in terms of total present value, which we denote by .
Part (0): The Static Nash Equilibrium
Notice that whenever these strategies call upon players to mix, future outcomes do not depend on current play, so incentive compatibility holds. The total present value payoff is
since we have normalized the payoff of the static equilibrium to be 0.
The remainder of the proof considers payoffs and incentive compatibility when the strategies call for a pure profile T A .
Recall that the probability that the two players make the same announcement in game N is 
where we have made use of the fact that the continuation payoff in the punishment state is 0. Since this equation holds for every starting point, including the case in which the current profile is static Nash, this implies the total present value payoff to using the proposed strategies in the game N with discount factor δ is the same as in the base game with discount factor δ . Thus the average present value 
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We now calculate the factor on the RHS:
Recall that the theorem asserts the existence of equilibria in the n-games with average payoffs n v and a sequence
It remains to show that these strategies are indeed an equilibrium for the n-games.
To prove this, we will show that (1) no player has an incentive to choose a nonequilibrium action when all players tell the truth, and that (2) it is optimal to use M regardless of the action chosen.
Part ( 
Because the base equilibrium is η -strict, the first two terms lose at least I (in total present value) compared to playing the equilibrium action. Hence the gain to deviating is When this is true, we take N H as specified above, otherwise, take N 5 H . 
Part (2): It is optimal to use
